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ScienceDirectTo address the adaptive value of optimism/pessimism an
operational definition is required. I define a behavioural
decision as relatively optimistic if it is consistent with the animal
having either, a higher expectation of reward, or a lower
expectation of punishment (threat), than the same animal in a
different state (or a different animal). Pessimism is the inverse of
optimism. Such relative behavioural biases can arise from
various cognitive mechanisms, and do not require inaccurate
(i.e. biased) cognitive representations of the probabilities of
either rewards or punishers. Normative models show that
optimistic and pessimistic behavioural biases can be adaptive
in the face of risk or uncertainty. Empirical evidence from a
range of species can be interpreted as supporting predictions
of these models. Behavioural biases are hypothesised to be a
key component of affective states, whose evolutionary function
is to prioritise the allocation of resources towards the currently
most important fitness-relevant activities.
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Introduction
Optimistic and pessimistic1 biases belong to a group of
decision-making phenomena referred to collectively as
cognitive biases. These phenomena were first documen-
ted by psychologists and behavioural economists studying
human judgement and decision making, but have more
recently captured the interest of evolutionary biologists
and researchers studying non-human animals.21 Henceforth I refer only to optimism and optimistic biases. Pessi-
mism is simply the inverse of optimism — a human or animal that is
more optimistic is simultaneously less pessimistic.
2 Henceforth, animals.
www.sciencedirect.com Interest in optimistic biases has its origins in two findings
from humans. The first is that healthy subjects are, on
average, optimistic in their future expectations [1], and
moreover, that they tend to rate their expectations as
better than they objectively are [2]. The second is that
there are consistent individual differences in optimism,
with more anxious and/or depressed subjects typically
being less optimistic than healthy subjects [3,4]. The link
between optimism and affective state in humans has
inspired applied ethologists and psychopharmacologists
interested in identifying behavioural correlates of affective
state to develop behavioural tasks for assessing optimism
in animals. The result is a growing body of literature on
optimistic/pessimistic biases in animals [5,6,7–9].
The above findings have sparked the interest of beha-
vioural ecologists, because cases of apparent irrationality
and unexplained individual differences in behaviour are
challenges for adaptationist accounts of behaviour
[10,11]. However, attempts to explain the adaptive value
of optimism are currently hindered by confusion over the
precise phenomenon under discussion: optimism is de-
fined differently by different constituencies of researchers.
A cognitive bias has recently been defined as, ‘A consis-
tent deviation from an accurate perception or judgement
of the world’ [12]. However, this definition is an unsat-
isfactory starting point for an exploration of the adaptive
value of optimism in animals (and probably also humans).
The definition focuses on biases in perception and judge-
ment (cognitive processes), but natural selection acts
directly on behavioural output, and the patterns of
responses recorded in animal judgement and decision-
making experiments are behavioural responses, not cog-
nition. As I will show below, there is no simple mapping
between biases in cognitive representations and behav-
iour (Figure 1). Furthermore, the implication that opti-
mistic biases involve flawed decision-making is
inapplicable to the measures of optimism obtained from
the tasks currently used in animals in which there is no
objectively accurate response. Therefore, we need oper-
ational definitions of optimism at the level of observed
behaviour that are applicable to the data collected on
animals.
In the following sections I aim to clarify: first, the set of
behavioural phenomena measured in human and animal
subjects included under the umbrella of ‘optimistic cog-
nitive biases’, second, the role of cognitive mechanisms inCurrent Opinion in Behavioral Sciences 2016, 12:115–121
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A simplified diagram of some of the cognitive mechanisms involved when a subject responds to an ambiguous cue in a judgement bias task of
the type shown in Figure 2. R and P refer to cues predicting rewards and punishers. Emotional states or moods may modulate attention to cues,
perception of cues and attribution of expected utility to cues. Figure redrawn from [8].the generation of observed optimistic biases and finally
whether optimistic biases can be adaptive.
What are optimistic cognitive biases?
Unrealistic optimistic biases
In popular usage, a bias implies a judgement or decision
that is inaccurate. Bias is therefore an appropriate descrip-
tor of the finding that humans are on average unrealisti-
cally optimistic when asked to report the likelihood of
future events (e.g. their probability of winning a lottery or
being diagnosed with cancer) [2]. Data are obtained by
requiring subjects to estimate the absolute probability of a
future event or to estimate their probability of experienc-
ing a future event compared to an average person [13].
Given that it is possible to obtain estimates of a subject’s
true probability of experiencing an event or true position
on a distribution, subjects can be classified as unrealisti-
cally optimistic or pessimistic. Unrealistic optimism has
not been measured in animals because of the difficulty of
finding a behavioural measure that reflects a cognitive
representation that is just one element of the cognitive
machinery underlying decision-making (Figure 1).
Relative optimistic biases
In many cognitive bias studies, subjects are required to
respond to questions or stimuli to which there is ostensi-
bly no objectively accurate response. There are at least
three bodies of such research relevant to optimism, each
using different methods.
The first approach involves measuring a personality trait
called dispositional optimism using questionnaires such as
the life orientation test (LOT), in which subjects indicate
their degree of agreement with statements such as, ‘In
uncertain times, I usually expect the best’ [3,14]. TheCurrent Opinion in Behavioral Sciences 2016, 12:115–121 second approach involves studying responses to ambigu-
ous linguistic stimuli. For example, assessing spelling of
homophones (e.g. die/dye), priming effects of homographs
(e.g. batter) or interpretation of ambiguous sentences (e.g.
‘The doctor examined Emily’s growth’) [15]. The third
approach also requires subjects to respond to ambiguous
stimuli, but differs in not being dependent on language,
because simple response latencies [16,17,18], go/no-go
responses [19,20] or choices [21–25] are measured.
Due to the lack of a requirement for language, this third
approach is the only one currently developed for use in
animals, and the only one for which analogous tasks exist
in humans and animals [26,27]. In the most common form,
known as judgement bias tasks [8,28], subjects are
required to respond to ambiguous cues that are interme-
diate between two anchor cues on some continuous
stimulus dimension (e.g. tone frequency [24,25,29],
roughness of substrate [21,23], colour saturation
[17,19,30], spatial location [31,32]; Figure 2a). The
anchors differ in the valence of an associated outcome
(typically positive and negative or positive and less posi-
tive/neutral), and these valences have been learned dur-
ing a prior discrimination training phase. The reinforcers
used for positive outcomes are typically food (but see
[33,34] for the use of conspecific contact), whereas the
punishers used for the negative outcomes include un-
pleasant noises [35], bitter tastes [16,17,36], exposure to
potential predators [32,37], water spray [38] or electric
shocks [25,39]. In a simpler variant of these tasks, the
anchor cues are biologically meaningful to the subjects
and require no prior training (e.g. a smiling versus sad face
[27,40] or a con-specific image versus a predator image
[34]; Figure 2b). Ambiguous cues in these latter tasks are
morphed intermediates between the valenced anchors.www.sciencedirect.com
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Methodology used in standard judgement bias tasks with animal subjects. (a) A task (based on [17,30]) in which there is an arbitrary
association between the cues used and the associated outcomes. In such tasks a training phase is required in which subjects learn the cues
associated with reward (R) and punishment (P). Subjects are tested by presenting the two trained cues (R and P) and typically three additional
ambiguous cues designated NR for near reward, Amb for maximally ambiguous and NP for near punishment. Ambiuous cues are presented at
low frequency during the test phase only, and are typically neither rewarded nor punished. (b) A task (based on [33]) in which the cues used are
biologically meaningful to the subjects (in this case domestic chicks) and require no training because chicks are attracted to conspecifics but
frightened by predators (in this case, an owl). (c) Example data derived from such tasks. The measured variable is typically either the proportion
of go responses (shown) or latency to respond. The figure shows two alternative results: the green solid line corresponds to an optimistic
subject that responds to NR, Amb and NP similarly to R, whereas the red dotted line corresponds to a pessimistic subject that responds to NR,
Amb and NP similarly to P.Judgement bias tasks typically produce smooth generali-
sation gradients between the two anchor cues that can be
used to measure optimism (Figure 2c).
Since there is no objectively accurate response in any of
the above tasks, biases can only be defined relative to
the performance of a specified control group. Thus, an
animal is defined as relatively optimistic if it displays a
greater expectation of reward or a reduced expectation
of punishment than, either the same animal in a differ-
ent state, or another group of animals. Absolute mea-
sures of optimism can be obtained from all the above
tasks (although these will only be at the group level in
tasks where it is necessary to counter-balance the asso-
ciation between cues and valences across individuals
[41]), but they are hard to interpret (what does it mean
that the 50% morph between a sad and smiling face is
classified as sad? [40]). It is debatable whether the
phenomena discussed in this section should be called
biases at all [42], but the use of the term is now firmly
established in the animal literature [8].
Few studies have directly compared different measures of
relative optimism within subjects. One study on humanswww.sciencedirect.com found that dispositional optimism is positively correlated
with priors about expectation of reward computed from
choices on a novel behavioural task in which probability
of reward was relatively uncertain [43].
Relationships between unrealistic and relative biases
Few studies have directly compared measures of unreal-
istic optimism and relative optimism within subjects.
There is some evidence in humans that unrealistic com-
parative optimism and dispositional optimism are uncor-
related, suggesting that they are different phenomena
[44,45].
What mechanisms cause optimistic biases?
Unrealistic biases
Unrealistic optimistic biases are attributed to inaccurate
(overconfident) cognitive representations of the probabil-
ity of positive events occurring, because this is what
subjects are asked to report [46]. Thus an unrealistic
optimistic bias can be thought of as a representational
bias. However, this assumption should be treated with
caution. It has not been proven that people can accurately
report the content of their cognitive representation of the
probability of an event in isolation of their cognitiveCurrent Opinion in Behavioral Sciences 2016, 12:115–121
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Table 1
Payoffsa of possible outcomes in a go/no-go judgement bias
task.
True state of the world
Reward (R) Punishment (P)
Decision Go b c
No-go 0 0
a Where b is the fitness benefit derived from obtaining the reward and
c is the fitness cost suffered as a result of being punished.representations of its payoffs. Since behavioural decisions
should be informed by the expectation of an event, which
is the product of its probability and payoff, it is possible
that we do not have access to the contents of the separate
representations feeding into decision-making, and hence
report expectations as opposed to probabilities (see
Figure 1). A more profound criticism of this literature
shows that unrealistic optimistic biases can arise as a
statistical artefact of sampling procedures, and questions
whether they are real biological phenomena at all [47].
Relative biases
Differences in relative optimistic bias typically cannot be
attributed to a specific cognitive mechanism (for a misun-
derstanding of this point see [48]). A change in behavioural
output can be due to changes in any of the cognitive
mechanisms via which animals acquire, store and utilise
information in decision making (Figure 1; [8]), and from
studying behaviour alone, it is therefore not straightforward
to infer the cognitive process or processes responsible for an
optimistic bias [49] (although see [43] for a promising
approach). A relative optimistic bias could be produced by
greater attention to more positive stimuli or positive fea-
tures of stimuli [24], higher estimates of the probability of a
positive outcome or increased pay-off attached to a positive
outcome [8]. Recent studies using pharmacological manip-
ulations [22,32,50,51,52] and brain imaging techniques [53]
are starting to shed some light on the neurobiological
mechanisms underlying cognitive biases in animals.
Can optimistic biases be adaptive?
Many definitions of cognitive bias describe them as
flawed or irrational, and this has led to the assumption
by some authors that they are, by definition, evolution-
arily maladaptive [10]. However, recent theoretical work
suggests that biases at both the representational level (e.g.
the representational biases assumed to underlie unrealis-
tic optimism) and the behavioural level (e.g. relative
optimistic biases) can potentially be adaptive.
Representational biases
Bayesian decision theory shows that optimal decisions
should be based on unbiased (i.e. accurate) estimates of
the probability of outcomes and their payoffs [49]. On the
face of it, this suggests that biased representations of
probability will result in sub-optimal decisions, and be
maladaptive. However, theoretical work from the growing
evo-mecho field of research, which seeks to find adaptive
explanations for cognitive mechanisms [54,55], has shown
that this is not necessarily the case. Biased representations
of the probability of events, also referred to as self-decep-
tion, could evolve given specific assumptions [49,56]. For
example, it has been argued that self-deception could be a
less cognitively costly alternative, particularly when selec-
tion pressure exists for animals to deceive each other [56–
58]. A recent model that addresses criticisms of previousCurrent Opinion in Behavioral Sciences 2016, 12:115–121 work in this area [49,59] suggests that self-deception can
indeed evolve in certain circumstances [60].
Behavioural biases
Normative models exist for predicting how animals
should behave when faced with situations involving risk
and uncertainty (see [10] for a review of applications to
optimism). Although there is no objectively optimal re-
sponse in the judgement bias tasks used to assess opti-
mism in animals, it is reasonable to assume that animals
will respond in such tasks using evolved cognitive mech-
anisms for tackling risk and uncertainty. Following this
logic, the decision about how to respond to an ambiguous
cue perceptually intermediate between two cues associ-
ated with punishment and reward can be modelled using
an area of Bayesian decision theory known as signal
detection theory (SDT; [61]). Consider a test trial in a
standard go/no-go judgement bias task in which one
anchor (R) is associated with food reward and the other
(P) with punishment of some type (Figure 2a). On the
basis of the evidence available (the similarity of the cue to
each of the anchors) the animal must decide whether to
approach (go) or stay put/retreat (no-go). The four possi-
ble outcomes for the animal given its decision and the
true state of the world (whether reward or punishment
actually obtains) are shown in Table 1. SDT shows that
the optimal decision depends on: first, the strength of the
evidence provided by the cue that the true state of the
world is rewarding, second, the animal’s estimates of the
prior probabilities that reward and punishment will occur,
and finally, the payoffs (benefit or cost) for the animal of
the four possible outcomes [42,49]. Each of these quan-
tities must be estimated by the subject via perception of
the current environment, prior learning or evolution. Less
evidence of reward is required for a go response to be
optimal the higher the prior probability of reward and the
higher the payoff from reward relative to the costs of
punishment. Under this model, a pessimist can be
thought of as an animal with a bias towards the no-go
response, whereas an optimist is an animal with a bias
towards the go response (Figure 3).
Predictions from the SDT model are broadly supported
by empirical results derived from judgement bias tasks
mainly published within the applied ethology literature,www.sciencedirect.com
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Application of signal detection theory to behavioural optimism/
pessimism measured with a go/no-go task. The panels depict a
situation in which the distribution of cues predicting punishment (black
curve) overlaps with the distribution of cues predicting reward (red
curve), leading to a region of ambiguity over what is predicted. On
perceiving a cue, an animal has to make a decision about whether to
go to obtain reward or no-go to avoid punishment. The blue dotted
line depicts the position of the response criterion that determines the
value of the cue necessary for the animal to make a go response. (a)
Depicts a pessimist with a high response criterion that shows a bias
towards the no-go response. The pessimist experiences a low rate of
punishment but pays for this with a higher rate of missed rewards. (b)
Depicts an optimist with a lower response criterion that shows a bias
towards the go response. The optimist almost never misses a reward
but pays for this with a higher rate of punishment. The optimal
criterion depends on the animal’s prior information about the
probability of reward and relative costs of the two types of possible
errors that it can make (missing a reward or being punished; see text
for further details).although few papers discuss their results within this
framework (see [17] for an exception). As predicted,
the proportion of ‘go’ responses increases as the ambigu-
ous cue becomes more similar to R yielding the smooth
generalisation gradients typical in judgement bias results
(Figure 2c). Although most existing experiments in the
applied ethology literature do not explicitly manipulate
either, the prior probabilities of reward or punishment or,
the payoffs of reward and punishment, many of the
manipulations conducted can be construed in thesewww.sciencedirect.com terms. For example, manipulating an animal’s early de-
velopmental experience of food availability might alter its
priors about the availability of food in the world, and
hence reduce optimism that ambiguous cues predict food
[17,23]. Reducing feather condition might impair flight
and increase the costs of dealing with a predation attempt,
and hence increase pessimism that ambiguous cues pre-
dict punishment [62]. In general, it appears that a wide
range of manipulations that are likely to either alter
perceived prior probabilities of punishment and reward
and/or alter the state of the animals so as to alter their
payoffs from reward and punishment, produce predicted
shifts in optimism (for recent examples see [17,19,20,25,
29,31,32,36–38,41,63–65]).
Optimistic behavioural biases are hypothesised to be a
key component of affective states, whose evolutionary
function is hypothesised to be to prioritise the allocation
of resources towards the current most important fitness-
relevant activities [42,66]. The link between optimistic
biases and affect is strengthened by results showing that
optimistic biases measured using judgement bias tasks
correlate with established measures of subjective mood in
human subjects [26,27].
Conclusions
Different methods are used to measure optimism in
human and animal subjects, and different claims are made
about what is measured. It is important to distinguish
between optimistic biases in the cognitive representations
of quantities, such as the probability of obtaining a future
reward (representational biases), and optimistic biases in
observable behaviour (behavioural biases). Behavioural
biases are hard to define in absolute terms since there
is no objectively accurate response in the tasks used to
measure them. However, a relative definition is possible,
with an animal being defined as relatively optimistic if it
makes behavioural decisions consistent with it having
either, a higher expectation of reward, or a lower expecta-
tion of punishment, than either the same animal in a
different state, or a different animal. Thus far, only beha-
vioural biases have been measured in animals and the
evidence for representational biases in humans is weak.
Theoretical modelling has demonstrated that both rep-
resentational biases and behavioural biases can be adap-
tive. The adaptive account of behavioural biases is
supported by empirical results from experiments in which
either the past experiences or current environments of
animals are manipulated and predicted shifts in optimism
are measured. However, a formal meta-analysis of pub-
lished results is needed to test these associations properly,
because not all results are in line with predictions [24,67].
Behavioural biases are hypothesised to be a key function-
al component of affective states and play a role in allo-
cating behavioural decisions towards the most importantCurrent Opinion in Behavioral Sciences 2016, 12:115–121
120 Behavioral ecologycurrent fitness-relevant priorities [42,65]. Thus far, there
are only a few cases where comparable judgement bias
tasks to those used in animals have been applied to
human subjects [26,27]. Further work of this type is
needed to clarify the links between the subjective com-
ponents of affective states measurable only in humans
and the objective measures of optimistic behavioural bias
measureable across species.
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